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118 Abstract
In this paper we explore the effect of the long-gone Habsburg Military Frontier on 
modern institutions in Croatia. We use the Life in Transition Survey and geo-
graphic regression discontinuity design to identify the causal mechanism between 
historical institutions and attitudes towards trust and corruption. We find that the 
areas of the former Military Frontier are underdeveloped and poorer with worse 
economic performance indicators. Our results suggest that respondents living in 
the former Military Frontier territory have lower levels of interpersonal trust, a 
higher level of trust in public authorities, but also tend to bribe those institutions 
more often when they interact with them. We claim that the war in Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s is not just a confounding factor in the analysis but also a potential chan-
nel and find evidence that attitudes towards bribery can survive even harsh wars, 
while trust in public institutions collapses during extreme events of violence.
Keywords: development, geographic regression discontinuity, institutions, macro-
economics
1 INTRODUCTION
The notion that history, previous developments and path dependency are relevant 
for today’s socioeconomic context has recently attracted a lot of academic interest in 
economics. Indeed, since the pioneer work by North and Thomas (1973) and North 
(1981; 1990) in institutional economics, and Greif (1994; 2006) on the impact of 
persistence on culture and institutions in development, a series of scholars have 
recently further explored this research agenda, in terms both of research avenues 
and the employment of new empirical methods and identification strategies. Using 
the latest econometric techniques, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show 
how the institutions of early European settlers shape economic performance today, 
Glaeser et al. (2004) find that growth and human capital accumulation improve 
political institutions, Nunn (2008) shows a negative causal effect from Africa’s 
slave trades on current economic performance, while Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) 
argue that the historical initial level of coercion risk explains the different legal ori-
gins and legal systems that shape modern socioeconomic outcomes. This type of 
research has, rightfully, elevated economics as a discipline into a multidisciplinary, 
multidimensional high impact field, and the natural experiments they use have 
become a state-of-the-art tool applied to explain what causes growth.
In this paper we use a (quasi) natural experiment – the geographic position of the 
Habsburg Military Frontier in Croatia – to identify the causal relationship between 
historical institutions and the attitudes towards trust and corruption of households 
in modern-day Croatia. We show that history matters, that institutions are persis-
tent and that these deeper institutional relationships are important, both for policy-
making and for reform design. We argue that civic capital, i.e. trust, could be one 
of the causal mechanisms that is usually absent from standard macroeconomic 
literature. While these types of research designs are common in applied microeco-
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119Therefore, by using a natural experiment approach that yields intriguing results, 
we believe that we provide substantial insights into the functioning and develop-
ment of the modern Croatian economy and significantly contribute to the advance-
ment of methodological approaches in macroeconomic research.
Becker et al. (2016) claim that trust in institutions and corruption are the channels 
through which long-gone Habsburg political and institutional legacy affects mod-
ern day Europe. Building on their work we underline the fact that the former 
Habsburg-Ottoman border, along most of its length, was actually only the border 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg military cordon known as the 
Military Frontier. The Frontier, which existed for more than 350 years, and which 
was disbanded almost 150 years ago, was a militaristic establishment ruled from 
Vienna the purpose of which was to stop the Ottomans from making further 
inroads into Europe. This historic episode split the population into two parts, 
which lived under very different economic and political systems for a long period 
of time. It can be argued that the separation was exogenous to different factors that 
can explain existing differences in a number of observable modern-day outcomes. 
In that case, the assignment of households to the treatment can be taken as ran-
dom, as in an experiment. The former border cut through parts of present-day 
Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Hungary. This exogenous variation defined around 
the border enables us to use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to study 
within-country variation and look at effects of the Military Frontier on modern 
beliefs and attitudes.
Although the two parts of Croatia are comparable in most demographic outcomes, 
we find significant differences in activity rates and economic status. The indica-
tors are worse for the former Military Frontier and reveal that these areas are 
underdeveloped, poorer, and have higher unemployment rates and worse eco-
nomic performance indicators. In order to explain the observed differences in 
development, we use three waves of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), fixed 
effects and geographic RDD to estimate ordered logit models since the responses 
we measure are categorical variables. Our results suggest that respondents living 
in the former Military Frontier territory have a higher level of trust in public 
authorities, but also tend to bribe those institutions more often when they interact 
with them. We also find that affiliation with the Military Frontier has a statistically 
significant negative effect on interpersonal trust. It seems that an extreme institu-
tion-building case study, such as the Military Frontier, did not only instill trust in 
its public institutions, but that it negatively affected trust among people.
In the following section we explain natural experiments, review the literature on 
natural experiments in macroeconomics, and argue the challenges and advantages 
of detecting causality in macroeconomics. We explain the regression discontinuity 
design and our overall empirical approach together with the data in section IV, 
after an overview of the history of the Military Frontier. Section V presents our 
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120 In Section VI we tackle the most obvious confounding element and a potential 
channel in our analysis, that of the War for Croatian Independence and the estab-
lishment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the 1990s, which partially over-
lapped with the territory of the former Military Frontier. Finally, section VII con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for modern east-to-
west migrations and with it associated European policies.
2 NATURAL EXPERIMENTS IN MACROECONOMICS
Detecting causality in macroeconomics is a highly debated topic in empirical 
research, as the direction of causality is often unclear and the exact channels are 
indistinguishable, leading to lack of credible identification and poor policy advice 
(Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan, 2016). Due to the difficulty of the task at hand, 
most of the work done in empirical macroeconomics relies on matching condi-
tional correlations and finding highly-sophisticated ways to improve the fit of 
econometric models. Unlike natural and some social scientists, macroeconomists 
traditionally do not use experiments to detect causality, as neither field nor labora-
tory experiments are available to them. For obvious reasons it would be impossi-
ble to control a huge and complex system such as an economy of a country in a 
laboratory, while field experiments would be overly expensive and due to their 
inevitably vast socioeconomic impacts it is highly unlikely there would be con-
sensus to carry them out. However, there is an alternative in the literature referred 
to as – natural experiments.
As Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan (2016: 4) stated, natural experiments are “...
episodes that provide observable, quasi-random variation in treatment subject to a 
plausible identifying assumption”. An episode can be an introduction of a new 
policy measure, a historical episode or a naturally-occurring event such as a flood 
or climate change. As opposed to a laboratory experiment, macroeconomists have 
to argue convincingly that the intervention or treatment they are using is compa-
rable to an experiment; i.e. that it is randomly assigned. In order to argue random-
ness they have to compare the treated and the control group and show that their 
observable characteristics differ only in the fact that one group was treated while 
the other was not.
The main goal of natural experiments in macroeconomics is to identify causal 
mechanisms (which one cannot find in conventional macroeconomic models) in 
order to explain the fundamental causes of growth. Although standard macroeco-
nomic models seemingly provide those answers, their maximum reach is to give 
only approximate causes of growth that typically involve capital accumulation, 
technology, and investment. And while they are good at pinning down the mecha-
nisms of growth, they stop short of answering the why type of questions. The 
fundamental causes of growth on the other hand, would identify institutions, 
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121This paper uses a natural experiment to provide evidence of historical institutions 
having long-term effects on institutions, civic capital and economic outcomes. 
Natural experiments are fairly unexplored in Croatian economics and macroeco-
nomics. But in another context, they show that history matters, and that historical 
institutions have long-lasting effects, which, if ignored, will undermine most 
efforts at reform. Although civic capital is a slow-moving variable, it significantly 
determines societies’ capacity for growth leaving some with high, and others with 
low levels of civic capital. The Habsburg Empire is well known for its reputation 
of “good” institutions and it is documented that the former Habsburg territory 
enjoys higher levels of civic capital than that of its Ottoman neighbors. However, 
not all Habsburg institutions were driven to build civic capital, some were estab-
lished to defend the south-east borders of the Empire. Political history and the 
type of military colonialism that the Habsburgs preserved in Croatia for 350 years 
still largely influence economic performance in Croatia, especially within the 
country. We find that the areas that were formerly part of the Military Frontier are 
poorer, have higher levels of trust in institutions, a higher tendency to bribe them, 
and show less trust in other people (possibly related to the ethnic population mix 
in the area). These results are consistent with the colonial policies of the Habs-
burgs who exerted highly centralized authority through its military institutions, 
while at the same time failing to provide adequate resources to alleviate poverty, 
leaving the people to resort to corruption.
The literature on natural experiments in macroeconomics so far actually detected 
four fundamental causes of growth, adding luck and multiple equilibria to the 
institutions, social structure, and civic capital referred to above (Fuchs-Schün-
deln and Hassan, 2016). The effect of institutions on growth is extensively stud-
ied in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001; 2002) who use an instrumental 
variable approach, and in Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) who rely on 
regression discontinuity design. This type of literature uses rather simple econo-
metric methods, but their challenge lies in correctly and convincingly identifying 
that the treatment is indeed random and that the natural episode resembles an 
experiment. Acemoglu et al. (2003) study the effect of institutions on business 
cycles and find that bad macroeconomic policies are no longer correlated with 
macroeconomic volatility once the effect of institutions is controlled for. They 
claim that macroeconomic policies are just tools easily replaced by other bad 
tools and that they are rather symptoms of deeper institutional distortions that 
stand in the way of higher growth. Another strand of this literature tries to detect 
whether replacing bad institutions would lead to preferable outcomes. These 
studies look at the persistent effects of historical institutions such as colonialism 
(Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Iyer, 2010), forced labor systems (Dell, 2010), and 
communism (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007).
Social structure also plays a role; for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2005) show that those Western European countries that had a stronger merchant 
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122 known as Law Merchant (Milgrom, North and Weingast, 1990). On a similar note, 
in Russian regions in which the Holocaust significantly reduced the size of the 
middle class, political and economic outcomes were worse even decades later 
(Acemoglu, Hassan and Robinson, 2011). Moving away from social structure, 
differences in civic capital – encompassing trust, beliefs, norms, and traditions – 
lead a society to different outcomes. Guiso, Sapienza and Gonzales (2011:3) 
define civic capital as “...those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a 
group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activi-
ties”. Since civic capital is intertwined with institutions, the challenge in this type 
of research is to separate the effects in order to claim causality. Tabellini (2010) 
for example finds variation in civic capital within countries that dates even centu-
ries back in history and causes modern day differences in the level of economic 
development. Guiso, Sapienza and Gonzales (2016) study cities in Italy and 
whether they had free city status in medieval times. It turns out that a longer his-
tory of self-rule is correlated with both higher civic capital and higher levels of 
economic development.
Trust is probably one of the best examples of civic capital as it is a prerequisite for 
sales, financial and investment transactions, and contracts, particularly employ-
ment contracts. The importance of trust rises with the level of complexity in the 
economic system, and even if differences in trust were not so detrimental decades 
or centuries ago, they have certainly become so more. Algan and Cahuc (2010) 
isolate the effect of trust and find that higher trust among people leads to higher 
GDP per capita. Effects of trust go beyond growth, Guiso, Sapienza and Gonzales 
(2004) detect the exact mechanism that translates civic capital to economic 
growth. In their case they find that trust – represented by financial development 
and the level of sophistication of the financial system – plays a role in economic 
growth. The other potential channel could be that of regulation (Aghion et al., 
2010), where trust and government regulation are negatively correlated, implying 
that lower trust increases the incidence of higher government regulation.
These papers are just one piece of the puzzle as they provide evidence of civic 
capital having an impact on growth. The other part is detecting factors behind dif-
fering levels of civic capital. Literature provides three possible factors: historical 
institutions, experiences of violence and conflict, and climate (as surveyed in 
Fuchs-Schündeln and Hassan, 2016). Besides Tabellini (2010) and Guiso, Sapi-
enza and Gonzales (2016), one of the most influential papers that uses historical 
institutions to explain different levels of trust and attitudes towards corruption is 
Becker et al. (2016). Using geographic RDD they show that areas once part of the 
Habsburg Empire have higher levels of trust in institutions and lower levels of 
corruption than in nearby areas that were under the Ottoman rule. Regarding the 
effect of the history of violence on modern-day outcomes, Nunn and Wantchekon 
(2011) find that levels of trust are reduced in areas of Africa that were historically 
affected by the slave trade while controlling for a number of observable factors. 

























































44 (1) 117-145 (2020)
123countries that were exposed to more frequent authority changes in the historical 
time span of 500 years.
3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE MILITARY FRONTIER
Rothenberg (1960) writes that the Military Frontier existed for over 350 years, 
since the longest lasting Frontier on the south of Croatia was established in 1522 
and disbanded in 1881. In the 18th and 19th centuries the Frontier was divided into 
nine districts: the longest-living Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontier districts 
situated in modern-day Croatia (1522–1881), and eight provisional districts in 
other countries: the Danube, Tisa, Mureş and Sava Frontiers (1702–1751), the 
Banat Military Frontier (1751–1873), the Transylvanian Military Frontier (1762–
1851), and the Šajkaš Battalion (1763–1873). According to s.n. (1829) the popula-
tion of the Military Frontier in 1828 was 1,073,680, while Roksandić (1988) 
reports every 15th inhabitant was a soldier. Ethnically, the settlers were divided 
almost equally into indigenous Croats, dominantly Catholic, and refugees, pri-
marily Orthodox Serbs who were granted royal privileges to populate the Habs-
burg Military Frontier and serve in the war against the Ottomans.
Inside the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the settlers of the Military Frontier, the so-
called Grenzer (German) or Graničari (Croatian) enjoyed privileges in the form of 
land allotments and were free of serfdom in exchange for permanent military ser-
vice and loyalty to the Austrian Habsburg crown, instead of the Hungarian-Croa-
tian one that ruled the rest of Croatia. The Frontier was established to defend aris-
tocratic possessions of Inner-Austria and eventually to halt Ottoman armies intrud-
ing further into the Habsburg Empire. Rothenberg (1964) argues that the institution 
of the Military Frontier was a military establishment and an agricultural economy 
with barely any crafts or trade. He continues to explain the longevity of the Frontier 
not only by persistent Ottoman threats but also because the military status of the 
Grenzer was preferred to the manorial obligations in the civil part of the Empire. 
Eventually, the decline of the Ottoman Empire together with rising nationalistic 
aspirations and the abolition of serfdom in the 19th century eroded the leverage of 
imperial policy in the Frontier area and led to the final dissolution in 1881.
The life in the Military Frontier is explained in Roksandić (1988) who describes the 
society as being founded on a system of cooperative (or communal) families that 
provided soldiers from the pool of grown men, while women engaged in agricul-
ture, child and senior care as well as all remaining communal duties. Due to the 
elongation of the territory that spanned from the Adriatic sea all the way to the 
Carpathian mountains and a 1,800 km long border with the Habsburg Empire (see 
Figure 1), the Frontier never developed into a coherent social and economic area. 
Moreover, the borders to the Habsburgs were not natural geographic areas, nor did 
they come from historical borders, making most important social and geographic 
characteristics very similar on both sides of the border (Roksandić, 1988). On the 
other side, the Frontier bordered with the Ottoman Empire, and in most cases social 
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124 According to Amstadt (1969), the Frontier was super-institutionalized and super-
bureaucratized, and under constant pressures for reforms, the need for which par-
tially stemmed from the bureaucracy itself. Becker et al. (2016) showed that the 
Habsburg institutions established in the long-gone Habsburg Empire – even in 
areas very far from Vienna – survived both World Wars, the socialist system, tran-
sition, and persist to this day. Although the Military Frontier established institu-
tions, civic capital (culture), and identity different from the rest of the Empire, the 
demonstrated efficacy of the Habsburg administration does not give reason to 
doubt its effectiveness in establishing military colonialism. As Habsburg civic 
institutions (Becker et al., 2016), religion (Boeckh, 2013), and nationalism (San-
ford, 1992), survived the twentieth century, it is plausible to assume that the herit-
age of military colonialism, i.e. the Military Frontier survived as well.
Figure 1 
Military Frontier in 1800
Source: The World of the Habsburgs (1800).
4 DATA, IDENTIFICATION, AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 DATA
In order to analyze the long-run persistence of the Military Frontier in modern-day 
institutions, we use all three waves of the LiTS collected by the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2006, 2010, and in 2016. LiTS 
records attitudes, opinions and values in post-transition countries. In particular, 
the first wave (2006) assessed public attitudes, well-being and the impact of eco-
nomic and political change; the second wave (2010) dealt mostly with the effects 
of the financial crisis; while the last wave from 2016 explored life satisfaction, 
corruption, and gender gaps in the labor market and business. The covariates in 
LiTS are observed at the individual level and they include information on the 
respondents’ age, gender, education, religion, labor market status, household size, 
number of children under age 14, and – most importantly – location of residence. 
Figure 2 displays the location of respondents in the three LiTS waves differentiat-
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125restrict the analysis to modern-day Croatia because the Croatian and Slavonian 
districts represent the longest-lasting Military Frontier, persisting for 359 years. 
The part of the Slavonian district in the far east (Eastern Syrmium) is left out from 
the analysis because the area came under the territory of the Socialist Republic of 
Serbia in 1945. For each location in our dataset, we provide corresponding geo-
graphic longitudes and latitudes together with information on affiliation with the 
Military Frontier using Regan and Kaniški (2003). A geographic information sys-
tem (GIS) is used to geocode location data in order to compute distances between 
locations and distances to the Military Frontier border, enabling us to take differ-
ent subsamples of respondents around a specified distance from the border.
As in Becker et al. (2016) we use corruption and trust in public institutions as our 
main outcomes of interest. In all three LiTS waves, the question on trust in public 
institutions in the survey is unchanged and reads: ’To what extent do you trust the 
following institutions?’ with courts and police among the offered institutions. The 
answer categories span from ’complete distrust’ to ’complete trust’, with ’some 
distrust’, ’neither trust nor distrust’, and ’some trust’ in between. We exclude a 
small number of observations that provide no answer, or where the answer is ’dif-
ficult to say’. Regarding corruption, the question of interest is ’In your opinion, 
how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/
gifts in these situations?’ where both courts and traffic police are included as pos-
sible situations. The answers proposed are: ’never’, ’seldom’, ’sometimes’, ’usu-
ally’, and ’always’. For our falsification test we use a proxy for social capital, 
constructed as a dummy variable for political party membership and voluntary 
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126 Figure 2 
Military Frontier 1868–1881 and the LiTS locations
Notes: Military Frontier in modern-day Croatia before its dissolution in 1881. We are grateful 
to Tomislav Kaniški from Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža who provided us with Military 
Frontier 1868–1881 shapefiles from Regan and Kaniški (2003). LiTS wave 2006 is presented by 
the red color, the 2010 wave with yellow, and the 2016 wave with the blue color.
Columns (1)–(4) in Table 1 report descriptive statistics of our individual-level 
covariates. There are 13.9% respondents that live in the territory of the former 
Military Frontier. The average age of all respondents is slightly above 50 years, 
there are 59% men, most of the respondents have secondary education, and are 
Christian. They live in small households (mean household size is 1.8) with the 
mean number of children under 14 equal to 1.4. Somewhat above 70% of the 
households in which they live own a car, a bank account, and has a debit or a credit 
card, while 86% own a mobile phone. Slightly above half of households own a 
computer and have access to internet at home.
4.2 IDENTIFICATION AND METHODOLOGY
Columns (5)–(8) in Table 1 report descriptive statistics for Military Frontier and 
non-Military Frontier separately. In terms of age, gender, education, religion, 
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127between the two subsamples. However, there are significant differences in terms 
of respondents working for income during the last 12 months, and all six house-
hold-level variables that reflect economic status. Presumably, the indicators are 
worse for the former Military Frontier, so we include them as controls in our 
analysis. These simple descriptive statistics show that the areas of the former Mil-
itary Frontier are poorer and have higher unemployment rates and worse other 
economic performance indicators.
Our basic model estimates the effect of an individual living in a location that was 
once under the Habsburg Military Frontier on his/her measures of trust and cor-
ruption. We estimate the following equation:
where i is an individual living in location l in a specific LiTS wave w, military 
frontierilw is an indicator that takes the value 1 if a location was a part of the Mili-
tary Frontier and 0 otherwise,  is a set of individual and household-level con-
trol variables, and  are LiTS wave fixed effects. We first estimate the model 
using all observations from the three waves in Croatia (Table 2), and then continue 
with border specifications – sample restricted to respondents living within 200 
kilometers from the former Military Frontier border (Tables 3 to 7). In our robust-
ness analysis we further restrict the samples, down to 25 kilometers around the 
border. In Table 7 we test the validity of our model by using different outcomes 
– such as trust in other people, and in private entities, and also social capital pre-
sented by membership in political parties – where we find that our falsification 
tests hold. We estimate ordered logit models since the responses are categorical 
variables, assuming a constant odds ratio.
We also propose the use of a geographic RDD approach. Following Dell (2010), 
we view institutions implemented in the Military Frontier as a deterministic and 
discontinuous function of geographic position, i.e. longitude and latitude. In other 
words, using the historical borders of the Frontier we are able to estimate the 
effect using the geographic RDD approach. While RDDs are a widely popular 
identification strategy in economics (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010), geographic RDD differs from the simple setup as the forcing 
variable is two-dimensional since location is uniquely determined by both longi-
tude and latitude. Therefore, the identification assumptions are identical – all other 
covariates must be constant across the Military Frontier border – but the estima-
tion is slightly altered. In particular, we estimate:
where outcomeilw is a realization of the outcome variable for an individual i in 
location l for a LiTS wave w, and military frontierilw is an indicator that takes the 
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129denotes individual and household-level covariates,  is a set of LiTS wave fixed 
effects, while outcomeilw denotes a flexible (polynomial) function of geographic 
location – either longitude and latitude or distance to border. In order to pinpoint 
our effect, we propose varying distances to border, bandwidths, starting with 200 
kilometers from both sides of the border and narrowing down to 25 kilometers.
5 RESULTS
In the first part of our analysis we estimate the model on the whole sample of 
households in Croatia. Table 2 uses 3,361 observations from 164 different primary 
sampling units (PSU) or places of residence collected from the three LiTS waves. 
The four models presented control for respondents’ age, gender, and religious 
affiliation.1 Our results show that living in a location that was once part of the 
Military Frontier is positively associated with higher trust in courts and police. 
Interestingly, when we control for the fact that the respondent actually interacted 
with the court or with the traffic police in the last 12 months, we find a statistically 
significant, strong, and positive relationship between living on former Military 
Frontier territory and unofficial payments/gifts – bribes – made to courts and to 
the traffic police. In other words, respondents seem to have a higher level of trust 
in public authorities, but also tend to bribe those institutions more often when they 
interact with them. Similarly, Becker et al. (2016) found that living in ex-Habs-
burg territory increases trust in courts and police, but they found an opposite effect 
for bribery, that it decreases the intensity of bribery. The Military Frontier is there-
fore somewhere in between the institution-friendly Habsburg Empire and the 
bribery-friendly manifestation of persistent economic under-development east of 
the civil part of Croatia, in this case possibly even confounded by the presence of 
Ottomans (for details on the relationship between corruption, socialism, and the 
Ottomans see Uberti, 2018).
5.1 BORDER SPECIFICATION
In order to make our treatment and control groups more comparable, we continue 
by restricting our sample to the border specification of respondents living within 
200 kilometers from the border. This slightly shrinks the total number of observa-
tions, while the number of locations by which we cluster falls from 164 to 159, 
preserving most of the statistical power. According to Table 3 the effects found 
persist, and remain robust. In three cases the point estimate is slightly lower sug-
gesting that there still might be unobserved location differences present. Regarding 
the size of the estimated effects, marginal effects presented in Table A1 of the 
Appendix suggest that when holding other variables at their means, living on the 
former Military Frontier territory increases the probability of moving to a higher 
1 Although minority status is an important determinant, the question from the first LiTS ’Do you consider your-
self as a member of an ethnic minority in this country?’, is not repeated in the two subsequent waves. Based 
on a question from the third wave ’What is your ethnicity?’ we were able to construct a minority dummy and 
repeat our analysis for the first and third LiTS waves only. These results are available on request and they sug-
gest that the results on all three LiTS waves are robust. The minority dummy is significant in a small number 
of cases and the sign and size of all other coefficients remains unchanged. The only change is in the statisti-
cal significance of our Military Frontier variable that goes down in some cases with trust as the outcome var-
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130 category of trust in courts by 3.8 percentage points, on average across the five cat-
egories. For the remaining measures, the average marginal effects are equal to 2.8 
percentage points for the trust in police, 6.8 percentage points for bribes to courts, 
and 4.2 percentage points for bribes to the traffic police. As there are five answer 
categories, their average share amounts up to 20% suggesting that the Military 
Frontier moves the public institutions categories by 14–34% on average. The mar-
ginal effects for Military Frontier affiliation are large in comparison to respondents’ 
age and gender, although they are somewhat smaller than some religion types.
Table 2 
Trust and corruption in courts and police
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
































affiliation (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for LiTS wave Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,361 3,411 3,272 3,302
No. of locations 164 164 164 164
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.046
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Dependent variable in 
columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institu-
tions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete 
distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. 
Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regres-
sions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how 
often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situa-
tions?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer 
categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 
= Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at 
the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
Table A2 provides details on the marginal effects by specific answer categories. 
Living in former Military Frontier territory increases the probability of reporting 
some trust in courts by 5.1 percentage points, and decreases the probability of 
reporting complete distrust in courts by 7.2 percentage points. Regarding bribes to 
courts, Military Frontier is associated with a 16.9 percentage points lower proba-
bility of reporting the category of never having to bribe, a 7.3 percentage points 
higher probability of having to bribe sometimes, and a 3.6 percentage points 
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1315.2 GEOGRAPHIC REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DESIGN
The results of our geographic RDD are presented in Table 4 with the two-dimen-
sional RDD in latitude and longitude in the upper panel, and the one-dimensional 
RDD with distance to border in the bottom panel. For the two-dimensional case 
we present four different specifications with either the linear, quadratic, cubic or 
quartic polynomial function of geographic location. The reference, linear, specifi-
cation is shown in the first row and it clearly resembles the results from the border 
specification (Table 3). At higher orders of polynomials, a lot of statistical signifi-
cance is lost – but as Gelman and Imbens (2018) suggest that controlling for poly-
nomials of orders above two leads to noisy estimates and poor coverage of confi-
dence intervals – we prefer the linear estimate. The one-dimensional case remains 
robust only for the outcomes related to bribes. The effect persists for the linear and 
the quadratic case, but also when we add an interaction term (distance to border 
multiplied with the Military Frontier dummy) to the linear case.
Table 3 
Trust and corruption in courts and police: border specification
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
































affiliation (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for LiTS wave Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,272 3,319 3,183 3,213
No. of locations 159 159 159 159
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.018 0.029 0.047
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Border sample: respond-
ents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border. Dependent variable in col-
umns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institu-
tions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete 
distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. 
Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regres-
sions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how 
often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situa-
tions?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer 
categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 
= Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at 
the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
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132 Table 4 
Geographic regression discontinuity design
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Polynomials in latitude and longitude
Linear polynomial 
(reference specification)
0.329* 0.267* 0.869*** 0.450*
(0.192) (0.147) (0.270) (0.253)
Quadratic polynomial 
in latitude and longitude
0.225 -0.076 0.902** 0.402
(0.232) (0.191) (0.445) (0.341)
Cubic polynomial 
in latitude and longitude
0.214 -0.077 0.825* 0.287
(0.243) (0.199) (0.485) (0.332)
Quartic polynomial 
in latitude and longitude
0.275 -0.210 0.697 0.356
(0.311) (0.249) (0.715) (0.469)
Polynomials in distance to border
Linear polynomial 
in distance to border
0.352 0.055 0.781** 0.460*
(0.244) (0.184) (0.371) (0.301)
Quadratic polynomial  
in distance to border
-0.006 -0.196** 0.773** 0.458***
(0.052) (0.083) (0.372) (0.146)
Interacted linear 
polynomial  









No. of observations 3,272 3,319 3,183 3,213
Notes: All reported estimates are coefficients of the variable “Part of Military Frontier” in a 
model specification that includes all control variables shown in Table 3. Coefficients and stand-
ard errors from ordered logit estimation. Border sample: respondents living within 200 km from 
the former Military Frontier border, based on GIS-computed distance from border. Standard 
errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 
10, **5, ***1 percent. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
5.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Although we do find statistically significant results, we subject our analysis to the 
bias-variance tradeoff and vary the distance to border that decides on the sample 
size and how close to the discontinuity – border – we run our analysis. We there-
fore narrow the bandwidth from the initial 200 kilometers to 150, 100, 50, and 
finally to 25 kilometers. We perform this exercise with the approaches taken in 
Tables 3 and 4 (the two-dimensional linear RDD), results of which are presented 
in the first rows of Table 5, i.e. for the 200 kilometer case. The point estimates 
appear to be rather stable when we decrease the bandwidth, and we can safely 
claim that the results are robust down to 50 kilometers around the border. At the 
narrowest band though (25 kilometers), only the result for bribes to courts holds, 
although the coefficients for the traffic police are statistically significant at the 
10.9% and 10.3% levels.
As mentioned earlier, there are significant differences in some individual and 
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133presumably endogenous to the Military Frontier as they mostly reflect the eco-
nomic status. In Table 6 we show the results when we include these additional 
control variables: working for income status, household size, number of children 
under 14, urbanization, and controls for household property such as owning a car, 
a bank account, a mobile phone, and/or a computer. Our results indicate that the 
results are arguably very stable; the variance does increase a bit, and the point 
estimates are somewhat smaller for the trust outcomes, and larger for the bribes 
outcomes. It is therefore safe to assume that none of the controls included could 
be a convincing alternative channel of the military colonialism effect.
5.4  MILITARY COLONIALISM, INTERPERSONAL TRUST  
AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
Finally, we run the analysis on interpersonal trust and trust in private entities, 
instead of trust in public services, to corroborate that the effect is coming from the 
public institutions and not from some pre-existing social life of the region. The 
Military Frontier in its approach did not interfere with the existing way of living, 
but channeled its power through newly-built institutions. We find that the affilia-
tion with the Military Frontier has a statistically significant negative effect on 
interpersonal trust (column (1) of Table 7), while the point estimate for the trust in 
trade unions is also negative. Becker et al. (2016) for example did not find a sta-
tistically significant effect for interpersonal trust, so it leads us to believe that the 
Military Frontier, as an extreme institution-building case study, did not only instill 
trust in its own public institutions, but that it negatively affected trust between 
people. The results in this paper reflect on historical intuition and on Greif (1994) 
that the population of the Military Frontier had good reason to trust Vienna as it 
protected them from local governments, feudal lords from the civil part of Croatia, 
and most importantly, from paying taxes. Meanwhile, the people that migrated to 
the Military Frontier from the East brought with them the culture of the East and 
Ottomans as well. And since the Ottoman Empire, unlike the Habsburg Empire, 
was not ruled by law (Uberti, 2018), it is not that surprising that bribery persisted. 
Also, the ethnic population mix laid the ground for higher trust in extended fami-
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134 Table 5 
Different bandwidths around Military Frontier border
Trust in Bribes to No. of
courts police courts traffic police observations clusters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




































RDD specification with linear polynomial in latitude and longitude (as in Table 4) 




































Notes: All reported estimates are coefficients of the variable “Part of Military Frontier” in a 
model specification that includes all control variables shown in Table 3. The number of observa-
tions and clusters reported in columns (5) and (6) refer to the average number of observations/
clusters in all four model specifications. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place 
of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
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135Table 6 
Additional control variables
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police






































































affiliation (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for LiTS wave Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for household
property (4 variables) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for education
level (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,272 3,319 3,183 3,213
No. of locations 159 159 159 159
Pseudo-R2 0.020 0.022 0.033 0.051











Controls (as above) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: respondents living 
within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border, based on GIS-computed distance from 
border. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do 
you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer 
categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = 
Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not 
stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer 
to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make 
unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): 
Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 
4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in 
regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parenthe-
ses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
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136 Table 7 
Interpersonal trust and membership in organizations
Trust in Membership in
other people trade unions political parties
civic 
organizations












Controls (as in Table 6) Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,243 3,196 3,370 3,370
No. of locations 158 159 159 159
Pseudo-R2 0.013 0.008 0.052 0.116











Controls (as in Table 6) Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,243 3,196 3,370 3,370
No. of locations 158 159 159 159
Pseudo-R2 0.015 0.009 0.059 0.118
Notes: Columns (1) and (2): Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. 
Columns (3) and (4): marginal effects and standard errors from probit estimations. Sample: 
respondents living within 200 km from the former Military Frontier border, based on GIS-
computed distance from border. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the 
question “To what extent do you trust the following [...]?” Column (1): Other people. Column 
(2): Trade unions. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither 
trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/
Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) 
is answer to the question “Are you a member of a political party?”. Dependent variable in col-
umns (4) is answer to the question “Are you a member of (other) civic/voluntary organizations?”. 
Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *signifi-
cance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Iyer (2010) for example found that British colonial-
ism in India had long-term adverse impacts on the social structure of affected 
areas, in the sense that they are now less able to exert their influence on policy 
makers to obtain an appropriate amount of expenditure on public goods. Spanish 
forced labor systems in Peru have a persistent negative effect on modern house-
hold consumption, most probably also due to lower access to education, health 
and public goods (Dell, 2010). It seems that the Habsburg Military Frontier due to 
its authoritarian centralized system was efficient in installing institutions, but due 
to its militaristic nature, not particularly interested or successful in caring for the 
social and economic fabric of the Grenzer society.
As a different falsification test, we also use proxies for social capital as our out-
comes. Regarding membership in political parties (column (3) of Table 7), we find 
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137in civic organizations. The latter could possibly be explained by the typical life in 
communities that persisted in the Military Frontier territory much longer than in 
the rest of Croatia, but further research is needed to confirm this hypothesis.
6 WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA
In this section we recognize that there is possibly a confounding element and a 
potential channel in our analysis and explore if our results hold if we take into 
account this endogenous shock. Due to the massive east-to-west migrations induced 
by the Ottoman conquests, the ethnic composition on the border with the Ottomans 
permanently changed. As a response to migration, but also due to the defense strat-
egies of Austrian noblemen, Vienna organized a military cordon on the eastern and 
south eastern borders of Croatia. It used the influx of mostly Serbian refugees to 
create a migration policy that consisted of the following. The area was to be popu-
lated by refugees that would be granted certain rights together with institutional-
ized ethnic and religion tolerance in the area of the Military Frontier in exchange 
for military obligations. The settlers were given land and they were freed from 
manorial obligations – serfdom – as opposed to the civil part of the Empire. The 
special status persisted until the dissolution of the Frontier in 1881 when its terri-
tory (and population) was unified with Croatia. A hundred years later, one could 
still observe that the ethnic composition from the 19th century was geographically 
preserved with relatively more Serbs living in the former Military Frontier area. 
With the collapse of socialist systems around Europe, Croatia opted for independ-
ence from Yugoslavia in 1991, spurring the proclamation of the so-called Republic 
of Serbian Krajina, which covered much of the area of the former Military Frontier. 
During the 1990s, the area was thus under fire, military occupation, and it endured 
extreme human and infrastructure losses. Taking this rather recent historical epi-
sode into consideration, one has to argue that it is possibly the war in Yugoslavia 
that is driving our results, and not the former Military Frontier, although the Fron-
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138 Table 8 
Trust and corruption in courts and police
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
































affiliation (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for LiTS wave Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,036 3,080 2,957 2,994
No. of locations 147 147 147 147
Pseudo-R2 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.043
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: areas behind the 
frontline at arrival of UN forces in 1992 are excluded. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) 
is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” Column (1): 
The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some dis-
trust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult 
to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent vari-
able in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it necessary 
for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column (3): 
Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 
= Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/
Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard errors clustered at the level of PSU 
or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 10, **5, ***1 percent. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016 and Šterc and Pokos (1993); see 
main text for details.
We therefore put our investigation under further scrutiny, and create two geograph-
ical subsamples. According to Šterc and Pokos (1993) we were able to identify 
LiTS household locations that were behind the frontline on the arrival of UN forces 
in 1992. The first subsample therefore excludes the areas behind the frontline on 
the arrival of UN forces in 1992 (Table 8); this way we completely exclude any 
occupied areas. The results are robust, although statistically significant only for the 
bribes to courts outcome. The bribes to traffic police issue is significant at the 
10.3% level, and that of trust in courts at the 15.7% level. When we exclude only 
the area that was behind the frontline in 1992 and that used to be part of the former 
Military Frontier (Table 9), the results are even more convincing as both bribe 
outcomes become statistically significant and strongly positive. What one might 
conclude is that the attitudes towards bribery are more persistent as they survive 
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139Table 9 
Trust and corruption in courts and police
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
































affiliation (6 categories) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for LiTS wave Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,184 3,230 3,106 3,143
No. of locations 155 155 155 155
Pseudo-R2 0.015 0.018 0.026 0.044
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors from ordered logit estimation. Sample: areas behind the 
frontline at arrival of UN forces in 1992 on the territory of former Military Frontier are excluded. 
Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust 
the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories 
are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 
= Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to 
missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In 
your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/
gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the 
traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = 
Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. Standard 
errors clustered at the level of PSU or place of residence are in parentheses: *significance at 
10, **5, ***1 percent. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016 and Šterc and Pokos (1993); see 
main text for details.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this research was to use a natural experiment in macroeconomics to 
identify a causal mechanism of a specific political system on modern-day civic 
capital in order to reveal some of the fundamental causes of growth. This is the first 
such research done for Croatia, as it goes beyond simple mechanics of growth and 
provides evidence that history matters and that institutions are persistent and have 
far-reaching impacts. The standard to achieve this goal in modern macroeconomics 
is to use natural experiments and pair them with methods borrowed from microe-
conometrics. The literature so far has offered that growth is causally related with 
institutions, social structure, and civic capital, both between and within countries.
Our identifying assumption is that the Military Frontier randomly split the country 
for a period of more than 350 years and established different economic and politi-
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140 former Military Frontier area is poorer than the rest of the country, and that this 
finding can be attributed to lower interpersonal trust, but higher trust in public 
institutions and higher incidence of bribery. These effects are not only statistically 
significant, but also quantitatively reasonable as he Military Frontier moves the 
trust in public institutions categories by 14–34% on average. The limitation to our 
study is that it builds on past events, and therefore cannot be generalized or used for 
speculating about the future. However, parallels can be drawn. For example, one 
can argue that the role of Vienna (as the center of the Habsburg Empire) has now 
just been replaced by other political centers, and that modern day decisions on east-
to-west migrations are once again in hands of politicians. As history teaches us, 
these decisions have far-reaching effects lasting for decades and centuries.
This study provides substantial insight into the functioning of the economy and 
explains factors that cause persistent differences in economic outcomes within 
Croatia. History matters, be it in the form of a military cordon, episodes of vio-
lence and war, or migration. Any reform or economic policy tool utilized without 
taking into account institutions, social structure and culture, will be ineffective 
and repeatedly replaced by another ineffective tool, because in order to change the 
trajectory, one must look into the underlying causes. Institutions and societies are 
persistent, but they also change, sometimes driven internally, and sometimes by 
exogenous events. Existing research teaches us that both persistence and change 
are equilibrium outcomes (Acemoglu, 1995), and that small steps and gradual 
reforms are usually not enough to move a country out of a ’bad’ equilibrium. Since 
both policy makers and institutions are inherently endogenous, providing recom-
mendations is naturally a complex task, one that asks for an empirically realistic 
theory of comparative growth based on institutions. Empirical research that 
explores the causal links between those endogenous elements is one step closer to 
building a more realistic theoretical framework for policy advice.
Disclosure statement 
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144 APPENDIX
Table a1
Average absolute marginal effects
Trust in Bribes to
courts police courts traffic police
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Part of Military Frontier 0.038 0.028 0.068 0.042
Age of respondent 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
Male respondent 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.010
Atheist 0.046 0.031 0.004 0.010
Buddhist 0.092 0.190 0.008 0.054
Jewish 0.137 0.101 0.097 0.137
Muslim 0.019 0.061 0.059 0.063
Other religion 0.001 0.034 0.048 0.013
LiTS wave 2010 0.020 0.068 0.069 0.089
LiTS wave 2016 0.074 0.081 0.043 0.067
Used service in last 12 months 0.050 0.061
Notes: Average absolute marginal effects of each independent variable for model specifications 
presented in Table 3, holding the other variables at their mean. Dependent variable in columns 
(1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust the following institutions?” 
Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 
= Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 = Complete trust. Category 6 = 
Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to missing in regressions. Dependent 
variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In your opinion, how often is it neces-
sary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/gifts in these situations?” Column 
(3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the traffic police. Answer categories are: 
1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/
Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. 
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145Table a2 




Complete distrust 0.072 0.025
Some distrust 0.024 0.022
Neither trust nor distrust 0.038 0.023
Some trust 0.051 0.044
Complete trust 0.006 0.027









Average absolute marginal effect 0.068 0.042
Notes: Average absolute marginal effects of each independent variable for model specifications 
presented in Table 3, holding the other variables at their mean. The last row presents average 
absolute marginal effect across categories and is the same number as presented in Table A1. 
Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is answer to the question “To what extent do you trust 
the following institutions?” Column (1): The courts. Column (2): The police. Answer categories 
are: 1 = Complete distrust; 2 = Some distrust; 3 = Neither trust nor distrust; 4 = Some trust; 5 
= Complete trust. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Not applicable/Not stated are set to 
missing in regressions. Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is answer to the question “In 
your opinion, how often is it necessary for people like you to have to make unofficial payments/
gifts in these situations?” Column (3): Interact with the courts. Column (4): Interact with the 
traffic police. Answer categories are: 1 = Never; 2 = Seldom; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Usually; 5 = 
Always. Category 6 = Difficult to say/Don’t know/Refusal set to missing in regressions. 
Source: Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) 2006, 2010 and 2016; see main text for details.
